Tag Archives: Mitre

Vulnerability Management news and publications #1

Hello everyone! In this episode, I will try to revive Security News with a focus on Vulnerability Management.

On the one hand, creating such reviews requires free time, which could be spent more wisely, for example, on open source projects or original research. On the other hand, there are arguments in favor of news reviews. Keeping track of the news is part of our job as vulnerability and security specialists. And preferably not only headlines.

Alternative video link (for Russia): https://vk.com/video-149273431_456239095

I usually follow the news using my automated telegram channel @avleonovnews. And it looks like this: I see something interesting in the channel, I copy it to Saved Messages so that I can read it later. Do I read it later? Well, usually not. Therefore, the creation of news reviews motivates to read and clear Saved Messages. Just like doing Microsoft Patch Tuesday reviews motivates me to watch what’s going on there. In general, it seems it makes sense to make a new attempt. Share in the comments what you think about it. Well, if you want to participate in the selection of news, I will be glad too.

I took 10 news items from Saved Messages and divided them into 5 categories:

  1. Active Vulnerabilities
  2. Data sources
  3. Analytics
  4. VM vendors write about Vulnerability Management
  5. de-Westernization of IT
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Microsoft Patch Tuesday June 2020: The Bleeding Ghost of SMB

This time, Microsoft addressed 129 vulnerabilities: 11 critical and 118 important. In fact, in the file that I exported from the Microsoft website, I saw 2 more CVEs (CVE-2020-1221, CVE-2020-1328) related to Microsoft Dynamics 365 (on-premises). But there is no information on them on the Microsoft website, in the MITRE CVE database and NVD. Does this mean that these CVE ids were mentioned unintentionally and related to some critical issues? I don’t think so, but this is strange.

This time there were no vulnerabilities with detected exploitation, so let’s start with the group “Exploitation more likely” according to Microsoft.

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Martian Vulnerability Chronicles

Well, there should have been an optimistic post about my vulnerability analysis & classification pet-project. Something like “blah-blah-blah the situation is pretty bad, tons of vulnerabilities and it’s not clear which of them can be used by attackers. BUT there is a way how to make it better using trivial automation“. And so on. It seems that it won’t be any time soon. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

I’ve spent several weekends on making some code that takes vulnerability description and other related formalized data to “separate the wheat from the chaff”. And what I get doesn’t look like some universal solution at all.

Pretty frustrating, but still an interesting experience and great protection from being charmed by trendy and shiny “predictive prioritization”.

Martian Vulnerability Chronicles

Literally, when you start analyzing this vulnerability-related stuff every your assumption becomes wrong:

  • that vulnerability description is good enough to get an idea how the vulnerability can be exploited (let’s discuss it in this post);
  • that CVSS characterizes the vulnerability somehow;
  • that the links to related objects (read: exploits) can be actually used for prioritization.

Actually, there is no reliable data that can be analyzed, trash is everywhere and everybody lies 😉

Let’s start from the vulnerability description. Great example is the last week critical Linux kernel vulnerability CVE-2019-8912.

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Vulnerability Databases: Classification and Registry

What publicly available Vulnerability Databases do we have? Well, I can only say that there are a lot of them and they are pretty different. Here I make an attempt to classify them.

It’s quite an ungrateful task. No matter how hard you try, the final result will be rather inaccurate and incomplete. I am sure someone will be complaining. But this is how I see it. 😉 If you want to add or change something feel free to make a comment bellow or email me@avleonov.com.

The main classifier, which I came up with:

  • There are individual vulnerability databases in which one identifier means one vulnerability. They try to cover all existing vulnerabilities.
  • And others are security bulletins. They cover vulnerabilities in a particular product or products. And they usually based on on patches. One patch may cover multiple vulnerabilities.

I made this diagram with some Vulnerability Databases. Note that I wanted to stay focused, so there are no exploit DBs, CERTs, lists of vulnerabilities detected by some researchers (CISCO Talos, PT Research, etc.), Media and Bug Bounty sites.

Vulnerability Databases classification

For these databases the descriptions of vulnerabilities are publicly available on the site (in html interface or downloadable data feed), or exist in a form of paid Vulnerability Intelligence service (for example, Flexera).

On one side there are databases of individual vulnerabilities, the most important is National Vulnerability Database. There are also Chinese, Japanese bases that can be derived from NVD or not.

On the other side we have security bulletins, for example RedHat Security Advisories.

And in the middle we have a Vulnerability Databases, for which it is not critical whether they have duplicated vulnerability IDs or not.

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Forever “reserved” CVEs

In this post I would like to provide some links, that you can use to find out necessary information about vulnerability by its CVE ID. I also want to share my amazement, how the method of using the CVE identifiers is changing.

Reserved CVE

Traditionally, CVE was a global identifier that most of vulnerabilities had. Have you found malicious bug in some software? Send a brief description to MITRE and you will receive CVE id. Some time later NIST will analyze this CVE, will add CVSS vector and CPEs and will put a new item to the NVD database. MITRE and NVD CVE databases were really useful source of information.

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Federated-Style CVE

It seems like MITRE Corporation wants to cut the costs of security projects. Once again. They transfered OVAL Project to the Center for Internet Security. Now MITRE announced the launch of a “Federated-Style CVE ID”. The idea is to give oportunity for other authorities to issue CVE IDs in special format.

cve

The federated ID syntax will be CVE-CCCIII-YYYY-NNNN…N, where “CCC” encodes the issuing authority’s country and “III” encodes the issuing authority. At its launch, MITRE will be the only issuing authority, but we expect to quickly add others to address the needs of the research and discloser communities, as well as the cybersecurity community as a whole. This new federated ID system will significantly enhance the early stage vulnerability mitigation coordination, and reduce the time lapse between request and issuance

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Testing Secpod Saner Personal vulnerability scanner

SecPod Technologies is an information security products company located in Bangalore, India. They are also known as top OVAL Contributor and NVT vendor for OpenVAS. Besides the products designed for a big enterprises (vulnerability scanner Saner Business and threat intelligence platform Ancor), they have either vulnerability and compliance management solution for personal use – Saner Personal. And personal means that this scanner will scan only localhost. It’s free, SCAP-compatible, it has remediation capabilities. And it works. =)

Secpod Saner Personal scanning results

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